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Monitoring is an executive function of working memory that serves to update novel
information, focusing attention on task-relevant targets, and eliminating task-irrelevant
noise. The present research used a verbal working memory task to examine how working
memory capacity limits affect monitoring. Participants performed a Japanese listening
span test that included maintenance of target words and listening comprehension. On
each trial, participants responded to the target word and then immediately estimated
confidence in recall performance for that word (metacognitive judgment). The results
confirmed significant differences in monitoring accuracy between high and low capacity
groups in a multi-task situation. That is, confidence judgments were superior in
high vs. low capacity participants in terms of absolute accuracy and discrimination.
The present research further investigated how memory load and interference affect
underestimation of successful recall. The results indicated that the level of memory
load that reduced word recall performance and led to an underconfidence bias varied
according to participants’ memory capacity. In addition, irrelevant information associated
with incorrect true/ false decisions (secondary task) and word recall within the current
trial impaired monitoring accuracy in both participant groups. These findings suggest
that interference from unsuccessful decisions only influences low, but not high, capacity
participants. Therefore, monitoring accuracy, which requires high working memory
capacity, improves metacognitive abilities by inhibiting task-irrelevant noise and focusing
attention on detecting task-relevant targets or useful retrieval cues, which could improve
actual cognitive performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Remarkable progress has been made using the concept of working memory (WM) by Baddeley
and Hitch (1974) to explain how people differ in their cognitive abilities. Daneman and Carpenter
(1980) created procedures for measuring working memory capacity (WMC), such as the reading
span test (RST) and the listening span test (LST), and demonstrated a significant correlation
betweenWMC and language comprehension. Furthermore,WMC is assumed to be relatively stable
within a person and independent of the specific language (Osaka and Osaka, 1992) or task (Turner
and Engle, 1989). Conway and colleagues reviewed the methodological merits of WM span tests as
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research tools, and noted that executive attentional processes are
critical components of the WM span tests, including the RST
(Conway et al., 2005). This may be why WMC predicts many
cognitive abilities.
Because Baddeley (1986) accepted the Supervisory Attentional
System proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986) as a basis
for the central executive component, many studies on WMC
have focused on attentional control with limited processing
resources (e.g., Just and Carpenter, 1992; Conway and Engle,
1996; Cowan, 1999; Osak et al., 2002; Engle and Kane, 2004; Kane
et al., 2007; for reviews see Baddeley, 2007; Chow and Conway,
2015). Baddeley (2007) conceptualized the central executive
components in relation to neuropsychological evidence from
patients with frontal-lobe damage, as abilities to focus, divide,
and switch attention. Cowan (1999) also developed an attentional
theory of WM that consisted of activated LTM and attentional
focus. Although Cowan’s (1999) model is structurally different
from Baddeley’s (2000), which contains more specific storage
properties, both agree that attentional focus plays a critical role
in WMC (Baddeley, 2012; Cowan et al., 2014).
Other research on WM explained attentional focus as the
ability to maintain or inhibit information (e.g., Engle and Kane,
2004; Miyake and Friedman, 2012). In the framework used
by Engle and colleagues, one function of executive control is
to actively maintain the task goal, and the other is to resolve
response competition or conflict by blocking goal-irrelevant
representations or responses (Engle and Kane, 2004; Kane et al.,
2007). Unsworth and Engle (2007) developed a dual-component
model that contains a process for maintaining goal-relevant
information in an active state (primary memory), and a process
for retrieving cue-dependent information in the presence of
irrelevant information (secondary memory). This model assumes
that individual difference in WMC can come from both active
maintenance in primary memory and controlled retrieval in
secondary memory. Similar to Engle’s framework, Miyake and
colleagues assumed that common executive function (EF) reflects
active maintenance of task goals, goal-relevant information, and
response inhibition (also see Miyake et al., 2000; Friedman and
Miyake, 2004; Miyake and Friedman, 2012).
Constant monitoring of WM representations is essential for
adding new information related to the task goal and eliminating
noise, that is, for triggering attentional control processes like
focusing (Osak et al., 2002) and updating (Miyake et al., 2000).
Although, most researchers assume that monitoring underlies
control, monitoring has not been a central topic in WM studies.
Monitoring plays an important role in the literature on
metacognition, which refers to knowledge and experience about
one’s own cognitive phenomena (Flavell, 1979). Nelson and
Narens (1994) proposed a framework that focused on both
cognition and metacognition with two levels of information
processes: the object-level and meta-level. In this framework,
monitoring processes evaluate ongoing task performance, which
is represented as bottom-up information flow from the object-
level to the meta-level. Based on the monitored information,
top-down flow from control processes conveys commands for
continuation, breaking, or modification from the meta-level to
object-level processor.
To measure the function of monitoring in cognitive processes,
metacognitive judgments are used: ease of learning, judgments of
learning (JOLs), source-monitoring and retrospective confidence
judgments (Nelson and Narens, 1994; Nelson, 1996; see also
Dunlosky and Metcalfe, 2009). When participants failed to
recall target items, feeling of knowing (FOK) and/or the tip of
the tongue (TOT) were evaluated (e.g., Schwartz, 2008). Many
previous studies have examined metacognitive judgments in a
variety of cognitive tasks, including paired-associate learning
(Nelson and Dunlosky, 1991; Nelson and Narens, 1994; Nelson
et al., 2004), general knowledge (Koriat et al., 1980; Schwartz,
2008), and sentence comprehension (Thiede et al., 2003; Maki
et al., 2005).
As for the bases of metacognition judgments, Koriat (2012)
classified theoretical approaches as follows. The direct-access
approach proposes that metacognitive judgments depend on
the existence and strength of stored memory traces. The
information-based approach focuses on an analytic inference
weighing the pros and cons of information in memory
to reach a metacognitive judgment. The experience-based
approach assumes that mnemonic cues derived online from task
performance directly evoke a metacognitive feeling. Put another
way, monitoring is supposed to survey WM representations to
detect (a) the existence and strength of target traces, (b) the
outcome of probability inference, or (c) availablemnemonic cues.
Considered within the dual-component model of WM
(Unsworth and Engle, 2007), direct access to target memory
traces can be equivalent to monitoring the contents of primary
memory related to a task goal. TheMiyake and Friedman’s (2012)
unity/diversity model also supports the active maintenance of
goal-relevant information, in other words, target traces, with
the common EF mechanism. In object-level cognitive processes,
direct access to target traces is essential to accomplish a task goal.
In meta-level monitoring, detecting mnemonic cues through
peripheral information is more important than the target trace
per se (Schwartz, 1994; Koriat, 2012). For instance, JOLs and
retrospective confidence judgments decrease with learning time
and retrieval time, respectively (Koriat et al., 2006). Such
inference processes in the information- or experience-based
approach require controlled retrieval from secondary memory,
as suggested by Unsworth and Engle (2007). This metacognitive
process corresponds to the updating and monitoring function
proposed by Miyake and Friedman (2012) that can manage
information gating and retrieval from non-target secondary
memory. Therefore, the accuracy of metacognitive judgments is
assumed to depend on the ability to find effective cues and ignore
goal-irrelevant information.
The previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies on WM discovered that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays
a crucial role in EF (for reviews see Shimamura, 2008; D’Esposito
and Postle, 2015). In addition, the basis of individual differences
in verbal WMC was reported to be associated with the neural
network between the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), in coordination with the
superior parietal lobule (SPL) activity especially for focusing
(Osaka et al., 2003, 2004, 2007). According to Shimamura
(2008), which reviewed findings from neurocognitive studies
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of WM and metacognition, various kinds of metacognitive
judgments should also depend on PFC activity, and PFC should
include metacognitive monitors and controllers for object-
level cognition. The ventrolateral PFC is involved in stimulus
selection, the ACC is involved in conflict monitoring, and the
DLPFC is involved in updating and rerouting (Shimamura,
2008).
Schwartz (2008) provided experimental data suggesting that
metacognition shares processes and resources with object-level
cognition. Schwartz examined FOK and TOT processes under
WMC constraints using a dual-taskmethod in which participants
had to maintain verbal information (four or six digits) or visual
information (a shape in a particular color) while answering
general knowledge questions (Schwartz, 2008). The results
showed that the number of TOTs decreased in the verbal WM
condition, and the number of FOKs decreased in the visual
WM condition, suggesting that temporal memory performance
declined when participants mademetacognitive judgments about
general knowledge (Schwartz, 2008).
The present research examined how WMC limits affect
metacognitive monitoring using a verbal working memory
task (LST). Assuming overlap between object-level and meta-
level processes based on PFC activity, individual differences in
cognitive abilities should contribute to metacognitive judgment
accuracy. Therefore, I confirmed the difference in monitoring
accuracy between high and low WMC groups on target recall
during the LST.WMC should influence workability and accuracy
of metacognitive judgments due to monitoring. In addition, this
research examined the interaction between memory load and
interference from monitoring noise to investigate the factors
that cause monitoring failures, especially underestimation of
successful recall.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Eighty-one Japanese undergraduate students participated in this
research for partial credit in an experimental psychology course.
Participants were all female and native speakers of Japanese
with normal hearing. Based on LST scores, 25 participants were
categorized as highWMC, and 25 were categorized as lowWMC.
Prior to WMC grouping, three participants were excluded for
performance on the secondary comprehension task lower than
0.5. The average age of the 50 participants in the WMC groups
was 20.58 years (SD= 0.79, range= 19–22).
To examine differences in cognitive and metacognitive
performance due to WMC, participants were categorized into
groups according to LST span and number of correctly recalled
words. According to Conway et al. (2005), the group classification
was based on quartile splits. The top quarter of the distribution
(25 participants) had a span score of 4.0 or greater and 60 or
more recalled words (span: M = 4.48, SD = 0.42; words: M =
63.08, SD= 2.60) and were categorized as highWMC; the bottom
quarter of the distribution (25 participants) had span scores of 3.0
or less and 54 or less recalled words (span:M = 2.58, SD = 0.43;
words:M= 47.56, SD= 5.16) and were categorized as lowWMC.
Mean accuracy on the secondary comprehension task (true/false
decision) was 0.76 (SD= 0.07) and 0.73 (SD= 0.08) for the high
and lowWMC groups, respectively. A one sample t-test indicated
that both scores were significantly greater than the chance level of
0.50 [high: t(24) = 17.98, p< 0.001; low: t(24) = 15.03, p< 0.001].
A student t-test indicated that the difference in true/false decision
accuracy between high and lowWMC groups was not significant
[t(48) = 1.53, p= 0.13].
All participants provided informed consent after they read an
instruction sheet about the research purpose and participants’
rights. The present research employed a behavioral experiment
which does not require ethical approval. The procedure of this
research did not include either invasiveness or intervention
according to Ethical Guidelines for Medical and Health Research
Involving Human Subjects, a Japanese guideline noticed by
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
as well as Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
Materials
A Japanese version of the LST (Osaka et al., 2003) that included
a primary word recall task and a secondary true/false decision
task was used. Stimuli were 70 Japanese sentences with 35–46
moras (M = 41.77, SD = 2.64). There were five trials for each of
four memory load conditions (two, three, four, or five sentences).
Memory load conditions varied in the number of target words
to be memorized, that is, the number of sentences processed
within a trial. Table 1 shows an example from the two-sentence
condition with the English translation. Target words were the first
word of each sentence, which were all nouns. For the true/false
decisions, 35 sentences were “true” (e.g., “Telephones are devices
that encode voices as signals to communicate with a distant
person and include mobile-phones”), and the other 35 sentences
were “false” (e.g., “When you make scissors with the right hand
and paper with the left hand while playing rock-paper-scissors,
the number of folded fingers is two;” the correct number is three).
Procedure
Participants were first instructed to listen carefully to a sequence
of sentences read by a female experimenter. They were required
to maintain the first word of each sentence, and, at the same
time, judge whether each sentence was true or false based on
general knowledge (see Figure 1). The number of sentences to be
processed within a trial increased by one sentence every five trials.
Immediately after the experimenter finished reading a sentence,
the true/false decision was written down. At the end of each trial,
participants were asked to recall every word they had memorized
during that trial, and to rate their retrospective confidence for
recall performance for each word from 0 to 100%. Although
participants were able to recall target words in an arbitrary order
within each trial, they were not allowed to recall the last target
first. There were two practice trials in the two-sentence condition
so that participants could learn the procedure.
The total number of correct words and span score were
measured. Span was defined as the highest memory load
condition level where the participant succeeded in three of
five trials, with 0.5 points added for two successful trials in
the following condition level. True/false decision accuracy was
used as a measure of listening comprehension performance, and
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TABLE 1 | Sample sentences in the two-sentence condition of the Japanese Listening Span Test.
When you make scissors with the right hand and paper with the left hand while playing rock-paper-scissors, the number of folded fingers is two.
Target word: (right hand) T/F decision: false
Telephones are devices that encode voices as signals to communicate with a distant parson, and include mobile phones.
Target word: (telephones) T/F decision: true
FIGURE 1 | Experimental procedure in the five-sentence condition. On
each trial, participants maintained the first word of each sentence, and judged
whether each sentence was true or false based on general knowledge.
Immediately after the experimenter finished reading a sentence, the true/false
decision was written down. At the end of each trial, participants recalled every
word they had memorized during that trial, and rated their retrospective
confidence for recall performance for each word.
confidence for word recall performance was used as a measure of
metacognitive monitoring.
RESULTS
Listening Span Test
Before investigating effects of metacognitive level, effects on
primary recall performance were examined using a mixed
analyses of variances (ANOVA) with memory load condition
(two, three, four, or five sentences) and true/false decision
accuracy (correct vs. incorrect) as within-subjects factors, and
WMC group (high vs. low) as a between-subjects factor.
Table 2 shows mean word recall accuracy for each memory
load condition. A two-way mixed ANOVA with WMC group
and memory load condition as factors revealed significant main
effects of WMC group [F(1, 48) = 144.55, p < 0.001, ηρ
2
=
0.75] and memory load condition [F(3, 144) = 60.99, p < 0.001,
ηρ2 = 0.56], and a significant interaction [F(3, 144) = 16.85, p <
0.001, ηρ2 = 0.26]. Multiple comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected)
showed significant differences in all the six pairwise tests using
the corrected critical p-value, 0.008 [two vs. three: t(49) = 4.15,
p< 0.001; two vs. four: t(49) = 6.82, p< 0.001; two vs. five: t(49) =
8.26, p < 0.001; three vs. four: t(49) = 5.28, p < 0.001; three vs.
five: t(49) = 7.31, p< 0.001; four vs. five: t(49) = 5.00, p< 0.001].
Post-hoc one-way ANOVAs of the interaction showed
significant simple main effects of WMC in the three- [F(1, 48) =
56.82, p < 0.001, ηρ2 = 0.54], four- [F(1, 48) = 142.35, p <
0.001, ηρ2 = 0.75], and five-sentence [F(1, 48) = 89.67, p< 0.001,
ηρ2 = 0.65] conditions. The effect ofWMC group on target recall
performance was not significant for the two-sentence condition
[F(1, 48)= 2.88, p= 0.10, ηρ
2
= 0.06]. Post-hoc one-way ANOVAs
for simple main effects of memory load also observed significant
effects for both high [F(3, 144) = 10.06, p < 0.01, ηρ
2
= 0.30]
and low [F(3, 144) = 67.78, p < 0.001, ηρ
2
= 0.74] WMC groups.
Multiple comparisons (Bonferroni test, the corrected critical
p-value 0.008) indicated that recall performance decreased as
memory load increased in the low WMC group [two vs. three:
t(24) = 5.99, p < 0.001; two vs. four: t(24) = 9.80, p < 0.001;
two vs. five: t(24) = 8.46, p < 0.001; three vs. four: t(24) = 3.42,
p < 0.001; three vs. five: t(24) = 4.89, p < 0.001; four vs. five:
t(24) = 3.33, p < 0.005]. In contrast, in the high WMC group,
accuracy was significantly lower in the five-sentence condition
than in any other condition [vs. two: t(24) = 5.37, p < 0.001; vs.
three: t(24) = 6.47, p < 0.001; vs. four: t(24) = 3.95, p < 0.001],
and there was also a significant difference in accuracy between
the three- and four-sentence conditions [t(24) = 3.03, p< 0.006].
Participants with highWMCdid not show a significant difference
in performance between the two-sentence condition and the
three- [t(24) = −0.81, p = 0.94] or four-sentence [t(24) = 2.27,
p= 0.03] conditions.
Next, mean accuracy in the primary word recall task was
compared between correct and incorrect true/false decisions in
the secondary sentence comprehension task (See Table 3). A
two-way mixed ANOVA indicated significant main effects of
WMC group [F(1, 48) = 92.62, p < 0.001, ηρ
2
= 0.66] and
true/false decision accuracy [F(1, 48) = 13.15, p < 0.001, ηρ
2
=
0.22]. There was no significant interaction between WMC group
and secondary task accuracy, suggesting that incorrect sentence
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TABLE 2 | Mean word recall accuracy in each memory load condition for high and low WMC participants.
2-sentence 3-sentence 4-sentence 5-sentence
M SD M SD M SD M SD
High WMC 0.96 0.08 0.96 0.06 0.91 0.07 0.84 0.07
Low WMC 0.91 0.12 0.74 0.13 0.66 0.08 0.57 0.13
TABLE 3 | Mean word recall accuracy for correct and incorrect true/false
decisions for high and low WMC participants.
Correct decisions Incorrect decisions
M SD M SD
High WMC 0.92 0.05 0.84 0.11
Low WMC 0.71 0.10 0.62 0.17
verification interfered with remembering targets regardless of
WMC.
Metacognitive Monitoring
Retrospective confidence for each recalled word was rated
from 0 to 100% as a measure of metacognitive monitoring of
LST performance accuracy. Confidence percentage scores were
converted to decimal scores to calculate metacognitive judgment
outcome scores (see Table 4). The following four indexes were
adopted based on Schraw (2009). Absolute Accuracy assesses
the precision of a confidence judgment with respect to actual
performance, and is calculated by the formula below, where N
equals the total number of confidence judgments, ci corresponds
to a confidence rating, and pi corresponds to a performance score
(Schraw, 2009, p. 36, formula 1):
Absolute Accuracy Index =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
ci − pi
)2
Bias refers to the direction and magnitude of overconfidence or
underconfidence (Schraw, 2009, p. 37, formula 3):
Bias Index =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
ci − pi
)
Scatter indicates the degree to which judgments for correct and
incorrect responses differ in variability (Schraw, 2009, p. 37,
formula 4):
Scatter Index =
1
N
[Nc var (ccorrect)− Ni var (cincorrect)]
Here, Nc and Ni indicate the number of correct and incorrect
items, respectively, and var (ccorrect) and var (cincorrect) indicate
variance in confidence judgments for correct and incorrect items,
respectively. Finally, Discrimination reflects an individual’s
TABLE 4 | Mean confidence in overall word recall performance and
monitoring index scores for high and low WMC participants.
High WMC Low WMC
M SD M SD
Confidence 89.03 12.51 81.79 14.55
Absolute accuracy 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.07
Discrimination 0.80 0.15 0.71 0.17
Bias −0.07 0.13 −0.06 0.12
Scatter 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
ability to distinguish between correct and incorrect outcomes
(Schraw, 2009, p. 37, formula 5):
Discrimination Index =
1
N
[
Nc∑
i=1
(ci correct)c −
Ni∑
i=1
(ci incorrect)
]
Here, ci correct and ci incorrect correspond to confidence for correct
and incorrect items, respectively. Relative accuracy (Schraw’s
formula 2) was not included here because participants only rated
confidence for individual trials, not the whole task.
For each measurement (see Table 4), the difference between
high and low WMC groups was examined with student t-tests.
The mean confidence score for recalled words was numerically
higher for the high vs. low WMC group, but the difference
was not significant [t(48) = 1.86, p = 0.65]. Absolute Accuracy
was significantly smaller in the high vs. low WMC group
[t(48) = −3.04, p < 0.01]. The high WMC group judged their
performance more precisely than the lowWMC group (Absolute
Accuracy scores of zero correspond to perfect accuracy).
Mean Discrimination scores were positive for both WMC
groups. A one sample t-test indicated Discrimination scores in
both groups were reliably different from zero [high: t(24) = 26.09,
p < 0.001; low: t(24) = 20.95, p < 0.001], suggesting participants
were more confident in correct vs. incorrect responses. In
addition, the discrepancy magnitude of Discrimination was
significantly larger in the high vs. low WMC group [t(48) = 2.02,
p< 0.05].
Bias scores were negative for both groups. One sample t-tests
showed that Bias scores for both groups were significantly
different from zero [high: t(24) = −2.83, p < 0.01; low:
t(24) = −2.63, p < 0.05], indicating that participants were
underconfident in their performance. The group difference in
Bias was not significant [t(48) = −0.22, p = 0.82]. Scatter indices
did not differ between groups [t(48) =−0.01, p= 0.996].
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Underestimation of Metacognitive
Judgments
Because participants underestimated successful memory
performance, two-way mixed analyses of variances (ANOVA)
tested confidence scores for correct word recall only, with
memory load condition (two, three, four, or five sentences),
secondary true/false decision accuracy (correct vs. incorrect), and
ongoing trial accuracy (correct vs. incorrect) as within-subjects
factors, and WMC group (high vs. low) as a between-
subjects factor. To examine possible factors that interfere with
metacognitive monitoring, post-hoc analyses were conducted for
simple main effects even when interactions were not statistically
significance at p< 0.05.
Memory Load
Mean confidence scores for high and low WMC groups were
examined in each memory load condition (see Table 5). A
two-way mixed ANOVA with WMC group and memory load
condition as factors showed a significant main effect of memory
load [F(3, 144) = 6.61, p < 0.001, ηρ
2
= 0.12]; neither the main
effect of WMC group [F(1, 48) = 9.08, p = 0.09, ηρ
2
= 0.06] nor
the interaction between WMC group and load [F(3, 144) = 0.56,
p = 0.65, ηρ2 = 0.01] were significant. Multiple comparisons
(Bonferroni test, the corrected critical p-value 0.008) indicated
that confidence was significantly lower in the five-sentence
condition compared to the three- [t(49) = 4.05, p < 0.001] and
two-sentence [t(49) = 3.33, p < 0.005] conditions. There was no
significant difference between any other pair of load conditions
[two vs. three: t(49) = 0.23, p = 0.82; two vs. four: t(49) = 1.29,
p= 0.20; three vs. four: t(49) = 1.26, p= 0.21; four vs. five: t(49) =
2.48, p= 0.02].
Further one-way ANOVAs of WMC effects revealed a
significant simple main effect in the four-sentence condition
[F(1, 48) = 5.19, p< 0.05, ηρ
2
= 0.10], and no significant effect in
the two- [F(1, 48) = 2.00, p = 0.16, ηρ
2
= 0.04], three- [F(1, 48) =
2.18, p = 0.15, ηρ2 = 0.04], or five-sentence [F(1, 48) = 1.77, p =
0.19, ηρ2 = 0.04] conditions. The post-hoc one-way ANOVAs
indicated simple main effects of memory load condition were
significant for both high [F(3, 144) = 3.34, p < 0.05, ηρ
2
= 0.12]
and low [F(3, 144) = 3.83, p < 0.05, ηρ
2
= 0.14] WMC groups.
Multiple comparisons (Bonferroni test, the corrected critical p-
value 0.008) indicated a significant difference between the five-
vs. three-conditions in the high WMC group [t(24) = 3.50 p <
0.005)]. There was no significant difference between any other
pair of load conditions in the high WMC group [two vs. three:
t(24) = −0.13, p = 0.98; two vs. four: t(24) = 0.08, p = 0.94; two
vs. five: t(24) = 2.29, p= 0.03; three vs. four: t(24) = 0.20, p= 0.84;
four vs. five: t(24) = 2.04, p = 0.05] or the low WMC group [two
vs. three: t(24) = 0.35, p= 0.73; two vs. four: t(24) = 1.90, p= 0.07;
two vs. five: t(24) = 2.38, p= 0.03; three vs. four: t(24) = 1.51, p=
0.14; three vs. five: t(24) = 2.44, p= 0.02; four vs. five: t(24) = 1.40,
p= 0.18].
Noise from the Secondary Task
To examine effects of additional information from the secondary
true/false task, confidence for correct word recall was compared
between correct vs. incorrect sentence comprehension (see
Table 6). A two-way mixed ANOVA indicated a significant main
effect of true/false accuracy [F(1, 48) = 14.87, p < 0.001, ηρ
2
=
0.24]. The main effect of WMC group [F(1, 48) = 2.85, p = 0.10,
ηρ2 = 0.06] and the interaction between WMC and true/false
accuracy [F(1, 48) = 3.15, p = 0.08, ηρ
2
= 0.06] were not
significant.
Simple effects for the interaction of interest were examined
using post-hoc one-way ANOVAs. Low WMC participants
showed a significant decrease in confidence for incorrect
true/false decisions despite their accurate word recall [F(1, 48) =
15.86, p < 0.001, ηρ2 = 0.40], whereas high WMC participants
did not show a significant reduction in confidence based
on secondary task accuracy [F(1, 48) = 2.16, p = 0.15,
ηρ2 = 0.09]. The post-hoc one-way ANOVAs also showed
a marginal difference between WMC groups for incorrect
true/false decisions [F(1, 48) = 3.66, p = 0.06, ηρ
2
= 0.07]. This
difference was not significant for correct true/false decisions
[F(1, 48) = 1.76, p= 0.19, ηρ
2
= 0.04].
Noise from the Ongoing Trial
Table 7 shows confidence for correct word recall on correct and
incorrect trials. A two-way ANOVA showed a significant main
effect of trial accuracy [F(1, 48) = 13.65, p < 0.001, ηρ
2
= 0.22].
The main effect of the WMC group [F(1, 48) = 1.36, p = 0.25,
ηρ2 = 0.02] and the interaction [F(1, 48) = 0.15, p = 0.70, ηρ
2
=
0.003] were not significant. Participants rated their confidence for
correct answers significantly lower due to other failures within
the ongoing trial, irrespective of WMC.
Further analysis of interest using Post-hoc one-way ANOVAs
indicated significant simple main effects of trial accuracy for both
WMC groups [high: F(1, 48) = 5.49, p < 0.05, ηρ
2
= 0.19; low:
F(1, 48) = 8.31, p < 0.01, ηρ
2
= 0.24]. While, simple main effects
TABLE 6 | Mean confidence in correct word recall for correct and
incorrect true/false decisions for high and low WMC participants.
Correct decisions Incorrect decisions
M SD M SD
High WMC 90.72 11.86 88.67 14.96
Low WMC 85.69 14.76 80.16 16.47
TABLE 5 | Mean confidence in correct word recall in each memory load condition for high and low WMC participants.
2-sentence 3-sentence 4-sentence 5-sentence
M SD M SD M SD M SD
High WMC 90.88 11.68 91.04 11.45 90.69 12.87 85.70 17.98
Low WMC 85.37 15.58 84.69 18.20 81.75 14.81 79.37 15.63
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TABLE 7 | Mean confidence in correct word recall for correct and
incorrect trials for high and low WMC participants.
Correct trials Incorrect trials
M SD M SD
High WMC 91.59 11.23 87.63 16.84
Low WMC 87.41 13.76 82.54 16.33
of WMC by post-hoc one-way ANOVAs were not significant
[correct: F(1, 48) = 1.39, p= 0.24, ηρ
2
= 0.03; incorrect: F(1, 48) =
1.18, p= 0.28, ηρ2 = 0.03].
DISCUSSION
The current research examined metacognitive monitoring when
WMC was limited. Participants had to maintain the first word
of each sentence in a sequence of spoken sentences (primary
task), and, at the same time, verify whether each sentence was
true or false according to general knowledge (secondary task).
Immediately after each sentence was read, participants made
true/false decisions, and then recalled all target words at the end
of the trial. Metacognitive monitoring was measured by ratings
of retrospective confidence for each word at recall.
First, this research confirmed that WMC affects absolute
accuracy of metacognitive judgments in a multi-task situation:
participants with high WMC were better at discriminating
between correct and incorrect recall, and their confidence ratings
were more consistent with their actual performance than low
WMC participants. Further examination of the underconfidence
bias showed that increased memory load and interference from
task-irrelevant information (inter- or inner-task noise) interfered
with monitoring accuracy. These interference effects suggest
differences in the ability to focus on monitoring outcomes
between high and lowWMC participants.
To explain the dissociation between confidence and
performance, recent metacognitive studies have adopted
inference-based rather than direct-access approaches, suggesting
that confidence judgments should depend on peripheral
mnemonic cues such as learning and response latencies
(Schwartz, 1994; Dunlosky and Metcalfe, 2009; Koriat, 2012).
According to Koriat (2012), for general knowledge questions,
“confidence and its accuracy appear to depend in part on the on-
line feedback from the process of answering a question or solving
a problem” (p. 7). However, it seems inappropriate to understate
the value of direct access to metacognition, as the LST requires
that participants retrieve memory traces of target words from
WM representations. Therefore, according to recent frameworks
for WM, accuracy of metacognitive judgments during a verbal
WM task may depend on the ability to find effective trace cues
within primary memory and to ignore goal-irrelevant mnemonic
cues from secondary memory.
Individual Differences in Monitoring
Accuracy
Differences in people’s cognitive abilities derived from WMC
have been explained by attentional control processes (allocation:
e.g., Just and Carpenter, 1992; focusing: e.g., Baddeley, 2007;
Osaka et al., 2007; maintenance and inhibition of proper
information: e.g., Engle and Kane, 2004; Unsworth and Engle,
2007; Miyake and Friedman, 2012; scope and control: e.g., Chow
and Conway, 2015) based on the underlying assumption that
monitoring is critical. Such attentional theories are supported
by neurocognitive evidence from fMRI studies, which suggest
that the basis of individual (group) differences in WMC
involve neural networks that include the DLPFC for updating
information, the ACC for monitoring conflicts (MacDonald
et al., 2000; Osaka et al., 2003, 2004; Shimamura, 2008), and
the SPL for focusing (Osaka et al., 2007). In observing the
cooperative activation of these regions in highWMC participants
during the RST, N. Osaka explained, “... this network was active
in monitoring the task performance, which probably helped
their task performance effectively” (Osaka et al., 2004, p. 8).
Supporting this assumption, the results of the present research
confirm significant differences in monitoring ability associated
with WMC.
Considered within the recent WM frameworks, proper
monitoring during a cognitive activity can facilitate detecting
differences between ongoing task performance and task goal
maintained in primary WM storage (Unsworth and Engle,
2007), and then regulate subsequent processes via feedback
from monitoring outcomes. Concurrently, monitoring might
trigger the gating function of updating-specific EF (Miyake
and Friedman, 2012) to inhibit unnecessary information (Engle
and Kane, 2004; Kane et al., 2007) and focus on goal-related
information (Osak et al., 2002) based on perceived conflicts
between representations within primary WM or interference
from task-irrelevant information in secondary WM (Unsworth
and Engle, 2007).
Although, low WMC impaired absolute monitoring
accuracy, low WMC did not block monitoring completely.
The positive discrimination scores in both WMC groups show
that participants were able to monitor their memory processes
even in the multi-task situation where cognitive resources were
in short supply, and to distinguish their recall success and
failure retrospectively. Participants were instructed to rate their
confidence in each recalled word before the experiment so that
they could intentionally monitor their performance. In addition,
confidence judgments were made immediately after recalling all
the targets within the recall phase of that trial. Instant re-access
to WM representations for metacognitive judgments after
recollection makes it possible for even low WMC participants
to detect whether target information remained active within
WM, and then to translate particular signal strength associated
with a memorized target word into a confidence rating. This
is consistent with the direct-access theory of metacognitive
judgments that assumes that the existence and strength of
memory traces are crucial cues to confidence (for reviews see
Schwartz, 1994; Dunlosky and Metcalfe, 2009; Koriat, 2012).
Factors that Contribute to
Underconfidence
The results of the present research show that memory load
may be one cause of the underconfidence bias. In both WMC
groups, confidence judgments mirrored the pattern of actual
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performance across memory load conditions, although the
interaction between WMC group and memory load condition
was more prominent for cognitive performance. For participants
with high WMC, accuracy and confidence judgments decreased
for five-sentence trials. For participants with lowWMC, cognitive
and metacognitive performance gradually decreased as memory
load increased. In addition, high WMC participants tended to
make more accurate metacognitive judgments than low WMC
participants in the four-sentence condition, which also showed
the largest group difference in memory performance.
Schwartz (2008) also found decreases in monitoring accuracy
by WM load: TOT judgments interfered with a verbal WM task,
and FOK judgments interfered with a visual WM task. This
suggests that WM and metacognitive monitoring share processes
and resources with respect to retrieval and attentional allocation
(for TOT, see Schwartz and Metcalfe, 2011). According to the
direct-access approach to metacognition, these results suggest
that WM load weakens target traces because of deficiency in the
shared resources among meta-level and object-level processes.
The weakened target trace signal might be responsible for
underconfidence in correct word recall in the present research,
and the absence of TOT in Schwartz (2008).
It is also possible to interpret the effect of memory load in the
current research according to the inference-based view, that is,
as a peripheral cue about task difficulty. Participants perceived
increasing task difficulty in accordance with their decrease in
memory performance, reflecting precise monitoring of overall
cognitive processes. Thus, theymay underestimate confidence for
correct answers when attention is focused on experience-based
cues of task difficulty rather than direct cues from target traces.
Other factors that may cause an underconfidence bias
are monitoring noise derived from the secondary sentence
verification task, and from within the primary memory task
trial. These both depend on experience-based cues of difficulty
or negative feelings from partial LST performance failure, but
they differ in the noise source. First, participants underestimated
their confidence for correctly recalled words when they failed
to make correct decisions in the secondary task. In that
case, participants may have emphasized task difficulty and
negative feelings in metacognitive judgments, monitoring their
effortful or unsuccessful experiences in the secondary verification
task. Furthermore, this underconfidence bias due to external
noise was stronger for low vs. high WMC participants.
High WMC may involve simultaneously inhibiting irrelevant
monitoring information from secondary memory and focusing
on important monitoring cues from target traces within primary
memory. Proper monitoring function is reflected in cognitive
performance: highWMC participants recalled more target words
than low WMC participants when secondary task performance
was incorrect, even though they made as many mistakes in the
secondary task as lowWMC participants.
Second, monitoring noise from the primary trial elicited an
underconfidence bias when participants partly failed to recall
target words within the current memory task trial. When target
words were retrieved, participants accessed the representation
in primary WM to detect all target traces for the current
trial. Then, they made responses according to memory trace
signal strength. Although, participants could distinguish between
correct and incorrect answers by monitoring memory traces,
an absent or weak trace signal may have impaired confidence
for correctly reported words. Unlike noise from the secondary
task, interference from failure within the primary task did
not contribute to individual differences. It appears difficult to
inhibit noise information and separate target representations
from integrated sub-processes within a trial independently of
WMC.
It is beneficial to identify which cues to be inhibited and
which to be focused because the use of proper monitoring
cues can facilitate cognitive performance. Previous research
that manipulated the consistency between the target word
for maintenance and the focus word for comprehension in
the RST showed that word recollection was facilitated in
low WMC readers when they were able to focus attention
on a single target-and-focus word in each sentence (Osak
et al., 2002; Osaka et al., 2007). This directing effect on
attentional control should translate to metacognitive monitoring
by manipulating important mnemonic cues. For example,
the present study suggests that emotional cues may be
promising: negative emotional experience evoked by partial
task failure impaired monitoring accuracy. Moreover,
Eysenck and Calvo (1992) proposed that anxiety impedes
the efficiency of EFs because task-irrelevant thoughts occupy
limited processing resources (for a review, see Derakshan and
Eysenck, 2009). In addition, the emotional value of stimuli
facilitates WM in some cases, but impairs it in others (e.g.,
Kensinger and Corkin, 2003). More data are needed to clarify
what kind of information is effective as a monitoring cue
from the viewpoint of individual differences in monitoring
accuracy.
In conclusion, the results of the present research confirmed
individual (group) differences in WMC in metacognitive
monitoring abilities. It also suggested that high WMC helps
inhibit irrelevant monitoring noise and focus on detecting target
traces or useful retrieval cues, which improves actual cognitive
performance. Future studies are needed to reveal more details of
monitoring processes and individual differences in monitoring
abilities.
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